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How Wages Change Over the Business Cycle
Modern economies experience 
recurrent fluctuations in business ac-
tivity. As output and employment fall 
in recessions and busts and rise in re-
coveries and booms, other variables of 
economic significance also go through 
lows and highs.  
One such variable is real wages. 
Generally speaking, real wages are 
he cyclical behavior of real wages — wages 
adjusted for inflation — has changed over 
time. Before World War II, real wages in the 
U.S. were countercyclical: They rose during 
recessions and fell during expansions. Since the war, 
however, wages have become procyclical, falling during 
recessions and rising during expansions. One standard 
explanation is that economic shocks shifted from the 
demand side of the economy prewar to the supply side 
postwar. In this article, Kevin Huang offers evidence 
of an alternative explanation: the increased role that 
intermediate goods play in the production process in the 
postwar era.
simply wages adjusted for changes in 
inflation.1 For a working family, real 
wages provide a source of real income, 
but this income must be earned by 
giving up valuable leisure time. For a 
business entity that must hire workers 
to carry out its operations, real wages 
constitute part of the firm’s real pro-
duction costs. The way in which real 
wages fluctuate over business cycles 
has important implications for both 
households and firms.   
The cyclical behavior of real wages 
has changed over time. In the prewar 
period (1919 to 1939), real wages in 
the United States were countercycli-
cal: That is, real wages went up during 
recessions and fell during expansions. 
Since World War II, real wages have 
become procyclical: They fall during 
recessions and rise during expansions. 
What might have caused this 
change in the cyclical behavior of real 
wages? One explanation attributes the 
change to a shift from disturbances 
(which economists call shocks) on the 
demand side of the economy during 
the prewar period to disturbances on 
the supply side in the postwar era. 
Generally speaking, shocks are 
unanticipated changes in variables, 
such as extreme environmental con-
ditions (severe weather, hurricanes, 
earthquakes, etc.), unanticipated 
changes in monetary and fiscal policy, 
and events that alter the world price of 
energy.  Typical examples of demand 
shocks include unexpected changes 
in the demand for money, unexpected 
changes in the money supply 2 or in-
terest rates (monetary policy shocks), 
unexpected changes in government 
spending (fiscal policy shocks), finan-
cial crises, exchange rate disturbances, 
and sudden changes in households’ 
tastes or preferences. Examples of sup-
ply shocks include sudden disruptions 
in oil supply, discoveries of oil reserves, 
and technological innovations. 
1In reality, there is more than one measure of 
inflation. In this article, our use of the term 
real wages refers to wages adjusted for a cost-of-
living index such as the consumer price index 
(CPI). The CPI measures the cost of labor in 
terms of a basket of goods consumed by a work-
er. An alternative notion of real wages is wages 
adjusted for the wholesale price index or the 
producer price index (PPI). The PPI measures 
the cost of labor in terms of the units of goods 
produced by a worker. The two ideas are often 
used interchangeably. To tell the story here, I
will follow this tradition of not distinguishing 
between these two measurements of real wages. 
2 The money supply is the quantity of money 
available in the economy with which to pur-
chase goods and services.Many economists have argued 
that demand shocks were more impor-
tant in the prewar period, especially 
during the Great Depression, an epi-
sode in which unexpected changes in 
the money supply and financial crises 
(such as bank failures) played a domi-
nant role. Supply shocks, on the other 
hand, are more important in the post-
war period, especially after the 1970s, 
when several large oil-price shocks hit 
the economy.  
But trying to explain the change 
in the cyclical behavior of real wages 
by pointing to changes in shocks hit-
ting the economy is not appealing 
because it does not capture all of the 
empirical facts. To provide a convinc-
ing account of this switch in real-wage 
cyclicality, we must look at another 
change in the U.S. economy between 
the prewar and postwar periods, name-
ly, the increased role of intermediate 
goods in the production process. For 
example, in the postwar period, the 
production of final consumption goods 
— such as home appliances, consumer 
electronics, and, more recently, com-
puters — requires more intermediate 
processing, involving greater shares of 
more processed intermediate inputs, 
such as pressed steel, plastic, glass, mi-
crochips, and processors, and smaller 
shares of labor and capital.3
As I will discuss, it is likely that 
the switch in real-wage cyclicality 
arose from the increased share of inter-
mediate goods in production. 
REAL WAGES: FROM 
COUNTERCYCLICAL TO 
PROCYCLICAL
Real-wage cyclicality is gauged 
by the statistical correlation between 
real wages and output. This correla-
tion measures how these two variables 
co-vary over time. Correlations must 
lie between -1 and 1: the closer the 
correlation is to -1, the more the two 
variables move in opposite directions. 
The closer the correlation is to 1, the 
more the two variables move in the 
same direction.   
Economists Susanto Basu and 
Alan Taylor have computed the cor-
relation between real wages and real 
output for the prewar and postwar 
periods (Figure 1).4 Their results show 
that, in the prewar era, the correlation 
between real wages and output was sig-
nificantly negative (-0.444), suggesting 
that real wages moved strongly against 
real output in this period. Postwar, the 
correlation between real wages and 
output is significantly positive (0.381) 
between 1945 and 1971, and it rises 
further (to 0.503) between 1972 and 
1992. Thus, real wages co-move closely 
with output after World War II. In a 
1996 article, Christopher Hanes pro-
vides evidence of this change in the 
behavior of real wages.
Another insightful account is 
provided by Ben Bernanke and James 
Powell, who examine the cyclical 
property of real wages for the periods 
1923 to 1939 and 1954 to 1982. They 
3 In a production economy, goods produced in 
one sector or industry may be used as interme-
diate inputs by the same or different sectors or 
industries for producing goods that may, in turn, 
be used as intermediate inputs by the same or 
different sectors or industries, etc., before a final 
consumption good is produced. Such an input-
supplier/output-demander relationship among 
sectors or industries is usually referred to as an 
input-output structure. The Input-Output Table 
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
summarizes the U.S. economy’s input-output 
structure. As Robert J. Gordon pictures it, “The 
gigantic matrix represents the real world, full of 
heterogeneous firms enmeshed in a web of intri-
cate supplier-demander relationships.” 
FIGURE 1
Real Wage and Real Output in the United States
(Deviations from Trend)
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Source: Basu and Taylor (1999a)
4 Basu and Taylor used a statistical technique 
to remove the long-term trends from the data 
in order to focus on how the data behaved over 
business cycles.
2 Q2 2006Business Review www.philadelphiafed.orgfind a marked difference in the cyclical 
behavior of real wages from the prewar 
to the postwar period. Bernanke and 
Powell’s study is important for another 
reason. One could argue that the mix 
of goods that households consume also 
changed from the prewar period to 
the postwar period, and the observed 
switch in the cyclical behavior of real 
wages could have simply reflected this 
change. Studies using aggregate data 
— that is, data for the economy as a 
whole — cannot directly address this 
issue. Instead, Bernanke and Powell 
employ industry-level data that control 
for the shift in the mix of goods. Yet 
their finding is broadly consistent with 
the evidence presented in Basu and 
Taylor’s paper, which is based on ag-
gregate data.5
In sum, the historical evidence 
suggests a general pattern in the evo-
lution of the cyclical behavior of real 
wages from countercyclical during the 
prewar period to procyclical in the 
postwar era. In particular, the cor-
relation between real wages and real 
output has switched from significantly 
negative prewar to significantly posi-
tive postwar.  
SHIFT FROM DEMAND SHOCKS 
TO SUPPLY SHOCKS: NOT A 
CONVINCING STORY
Economic theory is essentially a 
story about supply and demand. Busi-
ness-cycle theory seeks to understand 
how unexpected changes in supply or 
demand generate cyclical fluctuations 
of economic variables. As we’ve noted, 
one explanation for the switch in real-
wage cyclicality is based on this shift 
from demand shocks to supply shocks.
According to a well-known eco-
nomic theory, the classic Keynesian 
theory, demand shocks push prices and 
output in the same direction, but they 
do not immediately affect wages very 
much, because wages are usually set in 
advance.6 Consequently, real wages, 
that is, wages adjusted for inflation, 
move in the opposite direction from 
output: Real wages rise when output 
falls, since as output falls so do prices, 
while wages are sticky, and vice versa. 
According to another well-known eco-
nomic theory, the real business-cycle 
theory, how much workers get paid de-
pends on their productivity, and supply 
shocks generally mean that labor pro-
ductivity — output per worker — and 
output move in the same direction.7 As
a result, real wages and output move 
together. 
That real wages can respond 
countercyclically to demand shocks but 
procyclically to supply shocks might 
lead one to conjecture that it is indeed 
the shift from prewar demand shocks 
to postwar supply shocks that explains 
the shift in real-wage cyclicality.  In
particular, the oil-price spikes that oc-
curred in the 1970s are often viewed as 
the main factor that led to procyclical 
real wages during the postwar period. 
However, this hypothesis is not 
convincing for at least two reasons. 
First, while empirical studies suggest 
that oil-price shocks might have been 
an important force contributing to 
postwar business cycles in the U.S., a 
5 Other studies, such as the ones by Mark Bils; 
Gary Solon, Robert Barsky, and Jonathan Park-
er; and Katharine Abraham and John Haltiwan-
ger, provide corroborating evidence in support 
of such a switch in the postwar era. Evidence 
based on aggregate data is also provided in the 
article by Finn Kydland and the one by Wouter 
J. den Haan and Steven W. Sumner.
6 Keynesian theory emphasizes the role of 
demand shocks and wage contracts, that is, 
agreements between unions and firms on the 
level of wages firms will pay union workers over 
a certain period.
FIGURE 2
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Source: Haver Analytics (PPI for crude petroleum - not seasonally adjusted)
7 Real business-cycle theory emphasizes the role 
of supply shocks in the economy.
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in the U.S. and that monetary policy 
shocks accounted for between 50 and 
70 percent of the decline in real GNP
at the Depression's trough in the first 
quarter of 1933. 
For the postwar period, a study 
by Lawrence Christiano, Martin 
Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans 
and another by Edward Gamber and 
Frederick Joutz find that monetary 
policy shocks, and demand shocks in 
general, tend to generate procyclical 
real wages. Marvin Barth and 
Valerie Ramey also find evidence 
of procyclical real wages following 
contractionary monetary policy actions 
in the postwar U.S. economy. This 
reversed pattern in the cyclicality of 
real wages driven solely by monetary 
policy shocks is inconsistent with 
a story that relies on a shift from 
demand shocks to supply shocks. 
Thus, even in the absence of 
supply shocks, we have seen a switch 
from countercyclical to procyclical real 
wages. A convincing theory about this 
switch in real-wage cyclicality needs to 
hold up, even when demand shocks are 
the sole driving force of business-cycle 
booms and busts. Now, let’s turn to a 
theory that emphasizes the role of a 
change in the U.S. economic structure 




The key part of this alternative 
theory involves another major change 
in the U.S. economy from the prewar 
study by Kevin Hoover and Stephen 
Perez and another by Charles Fleisch-
man note that the price of crude oil 
remained relatively stable until 1973 
(Figure 2). Yet, the correlation between 
real wages and output had already 
changed from a significant negative 
value of -0.44 in the prewar period to a 
significant positive value of 0.38 from 
1945 to 1971, an era before the onset 
of the major oil-price shocks in the 
1970s.8 Indeed, as Christopher Hanes 
shows, real wages remain procyclical 
even if the period from December 1973 
through June 1980 is excluded from 
the postwar period. This suggests that 
forces other than oil-price shocks must 
have triggered the switch. 
Second, in contrast to the predic-
tion of the Keynesian theory, real
wages have responded differently to 
demand shocks in the prewar period 
than in the postwar period. In par-
ticular, the tightening of monetary 
policy triggered a rise in real wages in 
the prewar period, especially during 
the Great Depression, but a fall in real 
wages and output in the postwar pe-
riod. For the prewar period, two stud-
ies by Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey 
Sachs and another by Bernanke and 
Kevin Carey find that real wages were 
countercyclical and that monetary 
policy shocks were a central driving 
force of this result. On the basis of 
their finding, Bernanke and Carey 
dismiss explanations of the relation-
ship between output and real wages 
during the period 1929 to 1936 that do 
not involve monetary policy shocks. 
Michael Bordo, Christopher Erceg, and 
Charles Evans also present evidence 
showing that monetary policy tighten-
ing led to an increase in real wages 
during the downturn of 1929 to 1933 
8 James D. Hamilton argues that oil shocks led 
to some of the pre-1970 recessions in the U.S., 
but the cyclical effects of these shocks, as he 
shows, became much stronger during the 1970s.
Even in the absence 
of supply shocks, we 
have seen a switch 
from countercyclical 
to procyclical real 
wages.
to the postwar period: a shift in the 
mix of the types of inputs used in 
production. As we know, production 
of final consumption goods usually 
requires several types of inputs: labor, 
capital, and intermediate goods. The 
historical change is that, in the post-
war period, intermediate goods are 
used more in the production of final 
goods. In the prewar era, goods that 
households consumed were relatively 
less processed — typical prewar goods 
include simple farm and fishery prod-
ucts and basic consumer durables like 
hand tools, oil burners and heating 
apparatus, and coal stoves and ranges 
— and their production required 
mostly primary inputs (labor, capital, 
land, and coal). In the postwar period, 
goods that households consume are 
much more complex — typical post-
war goods include more processed farm 
and fishery products and increasingly 
more sophisticated consumer durables 
such as gas and electric appliances, 
home electronics, and intricately made 
cars and computers — and the pro-
duction of such goods requires greater 
shares of manufactured intermediate 
inputs, which themselves are typically 
more advanced goods.9
Several existing studies illustrate 
the changes in the production of final 
consumption goods and in the input-
output structure from the prewar to 
the postwar period. John Kendrick’s 
classic work documents value added 
(by labor and capital) and gross out-
put (which is the sum of value added 
and all intermediate inputs used in 
9 Recall that intermediate goods are goods (and 
services) that are purchased from other busi-
nesses and that are used up within the produc-
tion period. Although my discussion focuses on 
the role of increasing technological sophistica-
tion, the fact that the use of intermediate inputs 
has been rising over time might also reflect 
increased specialization of production, since, all 
else constant, the greater the degree of vertical 
integration, the lower is the proportion of inter-
mediate goods purchased in total output. Business Review Q2 2006 5 www.philadelphiafed.org
11 Susanto Basu’s estimate of the cost share is 
about 0.80. The revenue and cost shares of in-
termediate inputs calculated by Huang, Liu, and 
Phaneuf for the postwar period, based on data 
in the BEA’s 1997 Benchmark Input-Output 
Tables, are about 0.7.
production) for several key sectors in 
the prewar period. Using this informa-
tion, Zheng Liu, Louis Phaneuf, and 
I show that the share of intermediate 
inputs rose significantly in the postwar 
period.10
Two historical studies by Chris-
topher Hanes provide evidence that 
the input-output structure has become 
more sophisticated in the postwar pe-
riod. His general finding is that typical 
prewar goods were made of relatively 
unfinished goods, while typical post-
war goods involve more intermediate 
processing before they enter the mar-
ketplace. Hanes reports that the share 
of crude material inputs (such as farm, 
fishery, and mineral products) in final 
output in the United States fell signifi-
cantly from the beginning of the 20th
century to the end of the 1960s. He 
also reports that from the turn of the 
20th century to 1986, the share of con-
sumption expenditure on food (exclud-
ing restaurant meals) decreased sig-
nificantly, while the share of consumer 
durables, a category that includes 
many complex goods such as automo-
biles, increased steadily over the same 
period. The corroborating evidence 
in the two studies by Basu and Taylor 
lends further credence to the observa-
tion that intermediate goods make up 
an increasingly larger share of total 
U.S. output in the postwar period. 
Other studies provide evidence 
of the increased use of intermedi-
ate goods in production during the 
postwar period. The work by Dale 
Jorgenson, Frank Gollop, and Barbara 
Fraumeni shows that from 1947 to 
1979, intermediate goods account for 
a large share of the revenue from total 
manufacturing output in the U.S. and 
they account for an even higher share 
10 Our study shows that the share of intermedi-
ate goods in U.S. production was 0.4 prewar and 
0.7 postwar.
of manufacturing costs.11
To summarize, existing studies 
lead us to conclude that there has been 
a significant increase in the use of in-
termediate inputs in the U.S. economy 
from prewar to postwar.
INTERMEDIATE INPUTS AND 
THE SWITCH IN REAL-WAGE 
CYCLICALITY
The story of the switch in the 
cyclicality of real wages is built on 
the following reasoning. Real wages 
determine the amount of consumption 
goods that a worker’s wages can buy. 
The cheaper the good, the more of it 
can be purchased with wages. How 
cheap the good is depends on how 
much it costs to produce. The cost is 
usually composed of three parts: cost 
of capital, cost of intermediate inputs, 
and wages.  
Capital, such as plant and equip-
ment, can last for a relatively long time 
before depreciating completely. The 
value of capital depends on what the 
capital is used for during its lifetime. 
In a capitalistic world, this value is 
determined in the asset market, which 
usually responds quickly to changes in 
current and expected economic condi-
tions. As a result, the cost of capital 
that a firm incurs in order to carry out 
its production plans varies a lot over 
business-cycle booms and busts. 
Existing studies lead us to conclude that there 
has been a significant increase in the use of 
intermediate inputs in the U.S. economy from 
prewar to postwar.
In contrast, since making a so-
phisticated intermediate good typically 
requires some advance planning, a 
firm that needs to use an intermediate 
good often must lock into a contract 
that specifies a purchase price long 
before the good is delivered. The sup-
plier of the intermediate good often 
needs to lock into contracts with its 
own suppliers of other intermediate 
goods required for producing the first 
good. The business world is full of such 
sophisticated input-output relation-
ships. For instance, the production 
of a computer requires many types of 
intermediate inputs, such as a monitor, 
a motherboard, a hard drive, and an 
operating system. Producing a moni-
tor involves other intermediate inputs, 
such as plastic, glass, and electronic 
components, and making a mother-
board requires microchips, processors, 
and so forth. Such a business-to-busi-
ness supply-chain network is a popular 
business model in many other sectors, 
such as the automobile industry. 
As Robert Gordon describes, the 
intricate supplier-demander relation-
ships among many firms at many dif-
ferent stages of processing imply that 
a contractual price between two firms 
can also matter to other firms involved 
in the production process since they 
may be those other firms’ direct or 
indirect suppliers or demanders. As a 
result, the two firms may be reluctant 
to change their contractual price even 
if it is about time to renegotiate their 
contract unless they know those other 
firms will do so as well. Since it is dif-
ficult for all firms in this gigantic web 
of complex supplier-demander rela-tionships to synchronize the timing of 
their contract renegotiations, as dem-
onstrated by many empirical studies 
surveyed in John B. Taylor’s article, the 
price of an intermediate good can stay 
sticky much longer than the length of 
a single contract and typically does 
not immediately respond to changes in 
economic conditions.12
Firms often sign wage contracts 
with workers as well, and according 
to Taylor’s survey, the length of wage 
contracts for labor, on average, is about 
the same as the length of price con-
tracts for intermediate goods (about 
one year). Yet, the renegotiation of 
a wage contract is a relatively simple 
matter that usually involves only the 
employee and the employer. Thus, the 
wage of a worker typically stays sticky 
just as long as the length of a single 
contract and often responds somewhat 
to changing economic conditions. 
Generally speaking, the cost of 
capital is most responsive to changes in 
economic conditions, next are wages, 
and the contractual costs of intermedi-
ate inputs are least responsive.  
With this in mind, we are ready 
to tell the story. During recoveries and 
booms, when the level of output rises 
and firms demand more capital, labor, 
and intermediate inputs, the cost of 
capital rises quickly. However, because 
of contractual obligations, wages rise 
slowly, and the contractual cost of 
intermediate inputs does not change 
much. If the share of intermediate 
inputs in production is small, a firm’s 
production costs would rise more than 
its workers’ wages because the firm is 
paying more for capital and using more 
of it in production. The firm would 
pass on the increase in its production 
costs in the form of a higher price for 
its product.13 In consequence, because 
workers pay more for the firm’s final 
good, their real wages fall. The situ-
ation is quite different if the share of 
intermediate inputs in production is 
large. With a large share of intermedi-
ate inputs, a firm’s production costs 
would rise less than its workers’ wages 
because the contractual cost of the 
intermediate inputs is unchanged. As a 
result, because workers pay less for the 
firm’s final good, their real wages rise.   
The analysis for periods of reces-
sions and busts is symmetric. When 
intermediate goods make up a small 
share of the production process, real 
wages tend to move in the opposite 
direction from output (real wages are 
countercyclical). When intermediate 
goods constitute a large share of the 
production process, real wages tend to 
move in the same direction as output 
(real wages are procyclical). 
Liu, Phaneuf, and I demonstrate 
how the cyclical behavior of real wages 
can change when the share of inter-
mediate inputs rises. We show that 
as the share of intermediate inputs in 
production grows from its prewar value 
(0.4) to its postwar value (0.7), the cor-
relation between real wages and output 
switches from a significantly negative 
number (-0.498), close to its prewar 
value, to a significantly positive num-
ber (0.464), close to its postwar value.14
The Link Holds at Other Lev-
els. The link between the cyclical 
behavior of real wages and the share of 
intermediate goods holds not just for 
the U.S. economy as a whole; it also 
holds at the sector or industry level. As
noted by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and 
Evans, in the postwar U.S. economy, 
real wages are more procyclical in the 
manufacturing sector than they are in 
the economy as a whole. Incidentally, 
in the postwar era, the ratio of total 
sales to GDP is greater in the manu-
facturing sector than in the economy 
as a whole, indicating that the manu-
facturing sector uses a greater share of 
intermediate inputs in production than 
other sectors (see the table).15 The 
findings about the importance of inter-
mediate goods presented in this article 
lead to a natural conjecture that the 
differing shares of intermediate goods 
across sectors/industries may account 
for the observed differences in the be-
havior of real wages at the sectoral and 
industrial levels in the postwar U.S. 
economy.  
Although the analysis in this 
article is drawn from the U.S. experi-
ence, the general insight laid out here 
linking real-wage cyclicality to the 
use of intermediate goods may have 
implications for other economies. For 
example, the analysis suggests that 
real wages can be more procyclical in 
more developed countries than in less 
developed ones, since production in 
the more developed economies gener-
ally uses greater shares of intermedi-
ate goods. Thus, the implications for 
12 This is not to be confused with the notion 
that the spot price (the price for a good that 
is paid for now and for which delivery is made 
now) of certain components of intermediate 
inputs — such as oil — is quite sensitive to 
business cycles. What I have emphasized here 
is that pricing of products that use such inputs 
— including oil — is often based on contractual 
costs rather than the spot price.
13 The argument here ignores cyclical move-
ments in profit margins and assumes that price 
and cost move in proportion. 
14 To focus on how the data behaved over the 
business cycles, these authors applied the same 
statistical technique that Basu and Taylor used 
to remove the long-term trends from the data 
and computed the correlations based on the 
de-trended data. 
15 The U.S. input-output table has gone through 
a number of redefinitions by the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. I made the necessary re-
groupings to make the classifications of sectors 
and industries presented in the table consistent 
across the three selected years. The shares 
reported in the table are shares in revenue. To 
get shares in cost, one needs to adjust for profit 
margins in the corresponding sectors. 
6 Q2 2006Business Review www.philadelphiafed.orghouseholds and firms can also differ 
across countries in different stages of 
development. 
CONCLUSION
Over the past century, the U.S. 
economy has seen a significant change 
in the cyclicality of real wages and 
in the share of intermediate goods 
used in the production process. This 
article explains the link between the 
two: It’s likely that the switch in real-
wage cyclicality from countercyclical 
in the prewar period to procyclical in 
the postwar era can be attributed to 
the increased use of more processed 
intermediate goods in production. This 
shift in the cyclicality of real wages, 
the increased use of intermediate 
goods, and, more important, the link 
investigated here have implications for 
households and firms.
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Source: BEA Input-Output Table.  The shares reported in the table are shares in revenue.
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